Abstract
Introduction
With the development of Internet and information technology, electronic government has got serious attention from government, enterprise and academic world. Owning to advantages of remote internet voting, it plays an important role in electronic government. In order to increase confidence of the voters in remote internet voting system, many researchers have focused on design and verification on secure remote internet voting systems and protocols. Remote internet voting protocol is a key part of internet voting system. So how to develop and verify a practical secure internet voting protocol are challenging issues.
The practical secure remote internet voting protocol should include the following properties: Basic properties include privacy, completeness, soundness, fairness, and invariableness. Expanded properties include universal verifiability [1] , receipt-freeness [2] , and coercion-resistance [3] .
Soundness is typically consists of inalterability, eligibility and unreusability. Universal verifiability describes that any one can verify the fact that the election is fair and the published tally is correctly computed from the ballots that were correctly cast. Receipt-freeness is to protect against vote buying. The voter can not produce a receipt to prove that he votes a special ballot. Coercion-resistance means that it should offer not only receipt-freeness, but also defense against randomization, forced-abstention, and simulation attacks. formalize receipt-freeness as an observational equivalence. The idea is that if the attacker can not find if arbitrary honest voters A V and B V exchange their votes, then in general he can not know anything about how A V (or B V ) voted. This definition is robust even in situations where the result of the election is such that the votes of A V and B V are necessarily revealed. They also assume that the voter cooperates with the coercer by sharing secrets, but the coercer cannot interact with the voter to give her some prepared messages. They use adaptive simulation to formalize coercion-resistance. The ideas of this definition is that whenever the coercer requests a given vote then B V can change his vote and counterbalance the outcome. However, avoid the case where { } 1 2 , ' c c A c V V v = letting B V vote a is needed. Therefore requirement that when we apply a context C , intuitively the coercer, requesting { } 1 2 , c c A c V v to vote c , ' V in the same context votes a . There may be circumstances where ' V may need not to cast a vote that is not. In the case of coercion-resistance, the coercer is assumed to communicate with voter during the protocol, and can prepare messages which she should send during the election process. Their formal definition of coercion-resistance base on the informal definition: a voter cannot cooperate with a coercer to prove to him that she voted in a certain way. Their formal definition of coercion-resistance base on the informal definition: a voter cannot cooperate with a coercer to prove to him that she voted in a certain way. Lee et al. protocol [29] is analyzed with their formal model. Meng [30] also apply their formal model to analyze the protocol [9] . Delaune et al. [31] model receipt-freeness and analyze Lee et al. protocol [29] . Delaune et al. [28] also model receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance and analyze the Lee et al. voting protocol [29] . Delaune et al. [32] use applied pi calculus to model fairness, eligibility, privacy, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance and analyze the protocols [33, 29] . Backes et al. [34] point out that definitions of coercion-resistance [28] are not amenable to automation and do not consider forced-abstention attacks and do not apply to remote voting protocols, they give an formal model of security properties of remote internet voting protocol in applied pi calculus and use the ProVerif to automatic verify the security properties of Juels et al. protocol [7] . Gerling et al. [35] apply the model [34] with ProVerif to automatic verify Clarkson et al. protocol [36] .
Jonker and de Vink [37] also point out that the formal model [28] offers little help to identify receipts when receipts are present. So Jonker and de Vink present a new formal method, which uses the process algebra, to analyze receipts based on their informal definition: a receipt r is an object that proves that a voter v cast a vote for candidate c. This means that a receipt has the following properties: (R1) receipt can only have been generated by v. (R2) receipt proves that voter chose candidate.(R3) receipt proves that voter cast her vote. Jonker and de Vink provide a generic and uniform formalism that captures a receipt. Jonker [41] analyzes receipt-freeness of the protocols [3, 8, 33, 42] based on formalism [37] .
About definition of receipt proposed by Jonker and de Vink, Meng [43] think it is worth discussing. Firstly, about "(R1) r can only have been generated by v", in some voting protocol, one part of receipt is generated by the authority, not generated by voter. Secondly, they give the following auxiliary receipt decomposition functions: "α: Rcpt →AT", which extracts the authentication term from a receipt . Authentication term should be the identification of voter. Thirdly the author does not prove the generic and uniform formalism that is right in their paper. Finally they use a special notation, it difficult to use and generalize it. Hence Meng gives a formal logic framework for receipt-freeness based on V. Kessler and H. Neumann logic [17] and apply it to analyze Fujioka et al. protocol [33] .
Knowledge-based logics have been also used in the papers [44] [45] [46] to formally analyze the security properties of e-voting protocol. Jonker and Pieters [44] formalize the concept of receipt-freeness from the perspective of a anonymity approach in epistemic logic which offers, among others, the possibility to write properties allowing to reason about the knowledge of an agent a of the system with respect to a proposition p . Baskar et al. [45] give the formal definition of secrecy, receipt-freeness, fairness, individual verifiability based on knowledge-based logic and analyze receipt-freeness of Fujioka et al. protocol [33] . van Eijck and Orzan [46] use dynamic epistemic Logic to model security protocols and properties, in particular anonymity properties. They apply it to Fujioka et al.scheme [33] and find the three phases should be strictly separated, otherwise anonymity is compromised. Mauw et al. [47] use the process algebra to analyze the data anonymity of the voting scheme [33] .Talbi et al. [48] use ADM logic to specify security properties (fairness, eligibility, individual verifiability and universal
1. Syntax
In applied pi calculus, terms in Figure 1 consists of names variables and signature ∑. ∑ is set of function symbols, each with an arity. Terms and function symbols are sorted, and of course function symbol application must respect sorts and arties. Typically, we let a , b and c range over channel names. Let x , y and z range over variables, and u over variables and names. We abbreviate an arbitrary sequence of terms 1 In applied pi calculus, it has plain processes and extended processes. Plain processes in Figure 2 are built up in a similar way to processes in the pi calculus, except that messages can contain terms (rather than just names) and that names need not be just channel names: The process 0 is an empty process. The process Q P is the parallel composition of P and Q . The replication !P produces an infinite number of copies of P which run in parallel. The process .
vn P firstly creates a new, private name then executes as P . The abbreviation vn % is a sequence of name restrictions 1 , , l vn vn L . The process ( ) , .
in u x P receives a message from channel u , and runs the process P by replacing formal parameter x by the actual message. We use out u N P is firstly ready to output the message N on the channel u , and then runs the process P . The process [ ] C A is closed. A signature ∑ is eq uipped with an equational theory that is an equivalence relation on terms that is closed under substitutions of terms for variables. An equational theory is generated from a finite set of equational axioms. It models the algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives. We write 
2. Operational semantics
The operational semantic is inherited from the applied pi calculus and is defined by structural equivalence ( ) º and internal reduction ( ) ® . Structural equivalence in Figure 4 ( ) º is the smallest equivalence relation on extended processes that is closed by a conversion on both names and variables, by application of evaluation contexts, Structural equivalence can make the introduction and application of an active substitution and the equational rewriting of the terms in a process. Structural equivalence satisfies the rules in the following:
The rules for parallel composition and restriction are standard. LIAS A enables the introduction of an arbitrary active substitution. UBST S describes the application of an active substitution to a process that is in contact with it. Rewrite deals with equational rewriting.
Internal reduction ( ) ® relies on the equational theory and defines the semantics of process conditionals as well as input and output. Internal reduction in Figure 5 is the smallest relation on extended processes closed by structural equivalence and application of evaluation contexts such that: 
ProVerif
ProVerif is an automatic cryptographic protocol verifier based on a representation of the protocol by Horn clauses and applied pi calculus. It can handle many different cryptographic primitives, including shared-and public-key cryptography (encryption and signatures), hash functions, and DeffieHellman key agreements, specified both as rewrite rules and as equations. It can also deal with an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol (even in parallel) and an unbounded message space. When ProVerif cannot prove a property, it can reconstruct an attack, that is, an execution trace of the protocol that falsifies the desired property. ProVerif can prove the following properties: secrecy, authentication and more generally correspondence properties, strong secrecy, equivalences between processes that differ only by terms. ProVerif has been tested on protocols of the literature with very encouraging results (http://www.proverif.ens.fr/proverif-users.html). Recent research came up with an abstraction of zero-knowledge proofs, a primitive heavily used within electronic voting protocols such as JCJ protocol, Civitas protocol that is accessible to an automated analysis using ProVerif [34, 35] .
ProVerif is for the analysis of trace-based security properties and observational equivalence. Since the security definitions for basic properties and expanded properties including receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance for Backes et al. model heavily rely on observational equivalences, ProVerif is the only tool for our purpose of an automated verification of Meng protocol. Inspired by works of Backes and Gerling, we use it to automatically verify Meng protocol.
Backes et al. model
This section describes Backes et al. model [34] which is the first formal model that can be used to automatically verify remote voting protocols. Backes et al. model formalize key properties including the soundness, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance in remote internet voting protocol with applied pi calculus. Backes et al. model mainly model the soundness, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. In Backes et al. model the voter are classified into three types of voter: honest voter, corrupted voter, and ad-hoc voter. Honest voter are issued an identity by an issuer authority and behave according to the protocol specification. Corrupted voter will register and then simply output all their registration credentials on a public channel, thus the coercer and vote buyer can impersonate him in order to mount any sort of attack. Ad-hoc voters can behave arbitrarily; they do not necessarily follow the protocol, but are also not necessarily corrupted. In the following section we first introduce the soundness including inalterability, eligibility and unreusability, then receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance in Backes et al. model.
1. Soundness
 Informal definition: In the paper [34] , soundness is typically consists of the following three separate properties: Inalterability: no one can change anyone else's vote Eligibility :only eligible voters are able to vote Unreusability :every voter can vote only once for any t t v such that t t endvote v t there exists id t t t such that a t t stardid id t beginvote id v t and t t t t guarantees soundness Condition 1a and 1b models the inalterability and eligibility, respectively. This is done through requiring that every counted vote is either a vote casted by an eligible voter or a corrupted voter. In order to achieve unreusability it has to be assured that the matching between 
Backes et al. model formalizes the definition of soundness with the events including
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2. Receipt-freeness
 Informal definition: the voter can not produce a receipt to prove that he votes a special ballot. Its purpose is to protect against vote buying. This definition thus refers to an attacker that does not try to vote by impersonating the voter, but just tries to get a proof that the voter voted in a special way.  Formal definition: an election context S is receipt-freeness if there exists a plain process ' V such that in Figure 8 : to generate fake secrets, casts an extra vote using them, and provides a receipt of this invalid voting. Condition 2 deal with that an additional voter k that votes with fake registration secrets in case the voter i complies with the request of the coercer, and simply abstains if i cheats the vote buyer by casting a vote with fake secrets.
3. Coercion-resistances
The formalization that encompasses all properties except randomization attacks depicted below is taken from Backes et al. model.
In order to formalize coercion-resistance, the process called Extractor is introduced. Extractor plays an important role in formalization of coercion-resistance, which extracts the vote the coercer casts on behalf of i V and tallies it directly. Extractor depends on the construction of the particular electronic voting protocol and has to be provided by the user. figure 9 is an Extractor if and only if:
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Figure 9.Definition of Extractor
The channels 1 c and 2 c are the channels shared by the extractor with the coerced voter and the tallying authority, respectively. If the coercer casts a vote, then the variable z should hold this vote. The context C is required to be sequential so it does not contain any replications, which means that , and an election context ' S , such that in Figure 10 . 
Meng protocol
Meng protocol [10] promises that it can protect voters' privacy and achieves universal verifiability, receipt-freeness, and coercion-resistance with weak physical assumptions or procedural constraints. It mainly applies the encryption technologies which include threshold ElGamal cryptosystem, Mix net that guarantees privacy is a distributed protocol that takes as input a set of messages and returns an output consisting of the re-encrypted messages permuted according to a secret function [53] , homomorphic encryption, Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol [11] which is secure and has properties: completeness, strong deniability, weak deniability, security of forgery attack, security of impersonate attack, security of compromising session secret attack, and security of man-inthe-middle attack ， and the improved proof protocol that knowledge that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext [10] , Meng protocol assumes that the private key is private and that the channel between voters and registration authority is one way anonymous channel.
In order to describe clearly Meng protocol we classify the entities into are five types: registration authority, issue authority, bulletin board, voters, tallying authority. Registration authority is responsible for authenticating the voters. Issue authority takes charge of issuing the related key and credentials. Voters register for voting, get their credentials and post a vote. Tallying authority is responsible for tallying ballots.
Meng protocol includes four phases: preparation phase, registration phase, voting phase and tallying phase. In preparation phase the related keys and ballot are generated by issuer authority. It also creates the ballots shares which are encrypted with the ElGamal public keys. Both the sets of encrypted ballots shares signed by issuer authority are posted on the bulletin board. In registration phase issuer authority creates the voting credential shares and posts copies of the shares of credentials encrypted with ElGamal cryptosystem to a bulletin board. The same credential shares encrypted with different ElGamal public keys and attach a non-interactive deniable authentication proof of the equivalence between the encrypted share and the one the voter has received to its message are also provided to voters. In voting phase the voter vote his favor ballot and post it to bulletin board. Each voter multiplies the shares she has received from registration authority together with the encrypted shares of the ballot. Because of the homomorphic properties of ElGamal cryptosystems, the resulting ciphertext includes the sum of those shares and the ballot's shares. The resulting ciphertext is sent to the bulletin board. In the last phase, tallying phase, the tallying authority tallies the ballot and publishes the result in bulletin board.
 Preparation phase
Issuer authority generates the public/private ElGamal keys. The private keys of voter and authorities are secret. It also generates the ballot t B and send t B and its digital signature to bulletin board denoted by bulletin board. 
 Registration phase
at the same method.
Registration authority 
, , , 1, , , 1, ,
Where j C is the sum of the various shares of credentials..
 Voting phase
Voter j voter chooses his favorite ballot shares
 Tallying phase After the voting time expires, all ballots on bulletin board posted by allegedly eligible voters are mixed by the tallying authorities. Tallying authority publishes the tallying result on bulletin board.
Modeling Meng protocol with applied pi calculus

1. Function and equational theory
The function and equational theory is introduced in this section. We use applied pi calculus to model Meng protocol. We model cryptography in a Dolev-Yao model as being perfect. Figure 11 describes the functions and Figure 12 describes the equational theory in Meng protocol. 
, checkciphertext x x verify the two ciphertext 1 x and 2 x generated with the same plaintext. The basic equational theory is described in Figure 12 . It also contains and equational rules for abstractly reasoning about the knowledge proof that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext and used in the voting phase. In the voting phase the voter need to verify the equivalence between the encrypted share and the one the voter has received to its message are also provided to itself. During the registration phase, the voter acquires a private credential for voting. For this he contacts each of the registration authority and asks them for a share of the private credential. In order for a registration authority to prove the correctness of the share credential, Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol is used. Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol can convince only the voter of the correctness of the share credential, and nobody else. In particular the voter should be able to generate a fake proof of this fact, e.g. using his secret key. It modeled as ( ) 
, , y T pPKenc x PU r generated with the public key z PU and random number 2 r , are the same plaintext 1 x . Voter can use the equation
x SK y PK z x PK y SK z = to compare the MAC receives from registration authority in non-interactive deniable authentication protocol to the MAC generated itself with relative parameters. Zero knowledge proof modeled [51] in Figure 13 the applied pi calculus which is used in the model of the improved proof protocol that knowledge that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext with ElGamal cryptosystem
2. Processes
The complete formal model of Meng protocol in applied pi calculus is given in Figures below. Figure 14 -19 report the basic process include main process, voter process, corrupted voter process, registration authority process, issuer authority process and tallying authority process forming our of the model of Meng protocol. Figure 20 -25 offer additional and modified processes for the analysis of coercion-resistance. chRI are the private channel between registration authority and issuer authority. At the same time the main process generates the key parameters C for credentials, V for vote, S for nonhomomorphic cryptosystem, keyV for voter, and keyI for issuer authority.
Voter process is modeled in applied pi calculus in Figure 15 . Using ElGamal encryption, each voter get the non-interactive deniable authentication proof's ciphertexts .Because of homomorphic properties of ElGamal cryptosystem the resulting ciphertext cred includes the sum of credential shares. He sends cred through a public channel, so that the attacker can impersonate them in order to mount any sort of attack. The registration authority process is modeled in Figure 17 . The registration authority generate the voters id , then get the secret credentials shares 1 cred and 2 cred from issuer authority. After that he creates the ciphertexts of non-interactive deniable authentication proof that the proof of the equivalence between the encrypted share sent to the voter ( )
pPKenc NDAMAC PEP SK keyR PK keyV PEP PK keyR PK keyV r and ( )
pPKenc NDAMAC PEP SK keyR PK keyV PEP PK keyR PK keyV r . The issuer authority is modeled in Figure 18 . The issuer authorities get the shares of credential by 
sign T pPK enc projection cred PK C r SK C which encrypted with a set of ElGamal public parameters by the public channel pub . Tallying authority process is modeled in Figure 19 . After the voting time expires, the tallying authorities get the all ballots on bulletin board posted by allegedly eligible voters and then mixed it by
elfBlinding cenccred PK C . The shares of credentials posted by the registration authorities are also 
T pPK dec bcenccred SK C and ( ,
T pPK dec bvenccred SK V then compare them through a search algorithm and publish the tallying result on bulletin board.
According to the definition coerced-resistance of Backes et al. , in order to analyze coercionresistance of Meng protocol, the processes including cheating voter process, coerced voter process, modified tallying authority process, abstained voter process, extractor process, Meng-coercionresistance1 process and Meng-coercion-resistance2 process, are needed. The faking strategy of the cheating voter consists of generating a fake credential and sending it to the coercer. To generate the fake credential NDAMAC PEP PK R that causes this fake share to appear real to the coercer in Fig.20 . In Fig.21 the coerced voter sends his genuine
Public PEP Public PEP to the coercer. 
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3,4 1,2 Figure 26 . Meng-coercion-resistance2 process In Figure 22 the modified tallying authority sends the credentials and vote through chT E to the extractor process. The difference between the previous tallying authority process in Figure 19 and modified tallying authority process is that the tallying authority process in Figure 22 does not publish the credentials and vote to extractor process. In Figure 23 the abstained voter receives the related information and give up his vote. The extractor process in Figure 24 can identify this fake non-interactive deniable authentication proof as being a coerced vote. Notice, that the modified tallying authority process in Figure 22 shares a private channel chT E with the extractor a private channel chVE with voter.
The processes Meng-coercion-resistance1 in Figure 25 and Meng-coercion-resistance2 in Figure 26 need to be observationally equivalent in order to satisfy the definition coercion resistance of Backes et al. and to be able to automatically verify this property of the protocol.
Automatic verification of Meng protocol with ProVerif
ProVerif can take two formats as input. The first one is in the form of Horn clauses (logic programming rules). The second one is in the form of a process in an extension of the pi calculus [54] . In both cases, the output of the system is essentially the same.
In this paper we use an extension of the pi calculus as the input of ProVerif. In order to prove the soundness and coercion resistance in Meng protocol the applied pi calculus model are needed to be translated into the syntax of ProVerif and generated the ProVerif inputs in extension of the pi calculus [54] .
Firstly the soundness of Meng protocol is proved by ProVerif. In order to prove the soundness property, according to the definition of Backes et al. model [34] , the soundness consists of inalterability (condition 1a),ligibility(condition 1b) and non-reusability(condition 1a and condition 2). The analysis was performed by ProVerif. cred vencvote to the bulletin board. After the time expired tallying authority can tally the ballot and publish the results. The attack makes Meng protocol that it has not inalterability.
In order to deal with the attack on inalterability we can use the message
vencVoteAndCred T pPK enc vote cred PK V r = to instead the message ( ) , cred vencvote in voting phrase. Thus the improvement of Meng protocol is proved to guarantee inalterability, legibility and non-reusability for an unbounded number of honest voters and an unbounded number of corrupted participants. The result is showed in Figure 28 .
Figure 28. Soundness of improvement of Meng protocol
The proof of coercion-resistance in Meng protocol is also finished by ProVerif. According to definition of coercion-resistance in Backes et al. model [34] , the coercion-resistance is composed of one hypothesis and four conditions. The hypothesis describes that election context ' S that only differs from S in that the tallying authority additionally outputs messages on the channel 2 c shared with Extractor . In condition 5 an additional restriction is introduced that justifies the abstraction of the third voter by the Extractor : votes with invalid registration secrets are silently discarded by the tallying authority. If this was not the case a coercer could easily distinguish real from fake registration secrets. The observational equivalence between x S V v is proved in ProVerif. The result shows that the observational equivalence is true in Figure 32 . "Bad is not derivable "shows that observational equivalence is true.
According to the above verification we can conclude that Meng protocol has coercion resistance.
Conclusion and future work
Internet voting protocol play an important role in remote voting system. Meng protocol is one of the leading remote internet voting protocols that claims to satisfy formal definitions of key properties, such as soundness, individual verifiability, as well as receipt-freeness and coercion resistance without strong physical constrains. But the analysis of its claimed security properties is finished by hand which depends on experts' knowledge and skill and is prone to make mistakes. Recently owning to the contribution of Backes et al, Meng protocol can be analyzed with automatic tool ProVerif. In this paper the review of the formal method of security protocols are introduced then applied pi calculus and the automatic tool ProVerif are examined. After that Meng protocol is modeled in applied pi calculus. Security properties, including soundness and coercion resistance, are verified with ProVerif. The result we obtain is that Meng protocol has coercion resistance. But it has not soundness because ProVerif found an attack on soundness. Finally the improvement of Meng protocol is proposed, and also modeled in applied pi calculus and automatically analyzed in ProVerif. The result we get is that the improvement of Meng protocol has soundness. To our best knowledge, the first automated analysis of Meng protocol for an unbounded number of honest and corrupted voters is finished.
As future work, we plan to analyze other security protocols [55, 56] in ProVerif. It would also be interesting to formalize the security properties of remote internet voting protocols in the computational model with automatic tool CryptoVerif.
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